


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Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

DOCUMENT NO. 1
NO CHANGE IN DRAFT
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CLASS CHANGED TO: TS C S
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE 19/2/11 REVIEWER:

Dear Ed:

My note on Cold War Intelligence, dated 9 June 1958, crossed your memorandum on DOD Cold War Intelligence Requirements - For a Contested Free World Country of the same date.

You may recall that my note pointed out that I was not certain that a greater magnitude of collection or major changes in collation of intelligence information were necessary. Your draft, however, very effectively points up the kinds of questions that collated intelligence should answer for the purpose you have in mind. It may also possibly bring out some gaps in our collection guidance.

Dick Helms and I have both gone over your memorandum. In addition, I have had some of our more knowledgeable operations people interested in this subject study the paper. I am giving you here a consolidation of all these views.

We consider the draft an excellent and comprehensive compilation of the kinds of intelligence needed for the development and guidance of programs for forestalling and countering Communist efforts to take over free areas. In fact, one might call your draft the EEI for a commander in the cold war. One of our elements is using some of your ideas in a study on a related subject.

I note that though your draft is described as covering DOD requirements, it actually goes across the board and includes sociological, political, and economic factors as well as those of a more strictly military character. I think it is a good idea to gather all these facets into a single package to insure balance and coordination. I assume,

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however, that you envisage that the various elements of the Government would take action within the scope of their respective charters. You will recall that in an earlier conference we agreed that there were numerous activities that could be carried out appropriately without revising the present distribution of charter functions among Government agencies.

I was particularly impressed with the emphasis you have given to looking forward so that cold war operations can concentrate on preventive action. As you well know, the U.S. so often finds itself countering Communist activities as contrasted to precluding or frustrating them. The forward look is particularly appropriate in the subjects of paragraphs 1 a, 2, 4 and 10. It seems to me that in a redraft of the paper you might wish to spell this aspect out more specifically in respect to the subjects of paragraph 5 and 9 also. In addition, you might wish to make more specific mention of a need for information on trends in the political motivation and awareness of the people as a whole and of the ethnic and other groups making up the nation.

As I mentioned in my earlier note, much of the information to fulfill such requirements is already being collected. It is collated in a wide variety of documents such as the NIS and other regional and country studies prepared in, or for, various government departments and agencies. The hand books being prepared by WHRAF for the Army, certain Navy reports, U.S.I.A. Country Papers, and some of our own documents come to mind. What you have done, as I see it, is to propose analysis and collation of this material specifically for cold war operations purposes in respect to particular countries. In the process, you have expressed in a new way, some requirements for information and a number of objectives against which to interpret and collate that information.

I suppose the next step will be to have your requirements reviewed in the light of the intelligence guides now in the hands of collectors, so that indicated additions or changes may be made. After that, or perhaps simultaneously, I imagine the guides for such documents as the NIS would be reviewed against your proposals to see what modifications might be needed.

We have been faced with a parallel problem. We realize that we are only one of the users of the NIS, so we have not pressed for adapting it to our particular needs. Accordingly, we prepare special analyses as required

and have established small elements to make collations of intelligence materials for some particular planning and operational needs. We are always faced with a decision as to how far this refinement can and should go. We do not want our operators to be intelligence analysts. On the other hand, we do not like to have them spoon-fed to too great a degree. I think they need to study some original intelligence material to maintain a thorough understanding of the area. Furthermore, they need to study such material because the intelligence people are not always the best judges of what the operators need and intelligence processing of the material introduces an additional time delay. I am sure you will have to meet this issue in your situation in Defense.

We have written this memorandum as a device for getting our thoughts in order. We are now ready to sit down with you and discuss ways and means of making this effort bear fruit.

Sincerely,

Frank G. Wisner